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Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) is at the center 
of current efforts to strengthen health systems and 
improve the level and distribution of health and 
health services. The values that motivate this goal—
improving population health, fairness in access to 
health services and in the distribution of health, and 
financial risk protection—should also determine 
the path to it. In 2011, the World Health Assembly 
called on the World Health Organization (WHO) 
to provide support and advice to countries seeking 
to move towards UHC. The WHO Consultative 
Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage 
was set up to develop guidance on how countries 
can best address issues of fairness (or equity) that 
arise on the path to UHC. The Consultative Group 
issued its report, Making fair choices on the path to 
universal health coverage, in early 2014.1 The report 
has been widely discussed.2
After the publication of Making fair choices, 
work began on a set of case studies intended to il-
lustrate how the principles articulated in the report 
apply to a diverse set of cases. To develop these cases, 
the present group of authors, who are academics 
and health policy professionals, was convened. This 
paper reports three of these studies. 
The case studies are drawn from experience, 
but have been simplified to allow key ethical issues 
to be discussed in a compact and accessible man-
ner. They have also been generalized, to highlight 
features which apply to choices faced in many 
countries. Consequently, though they draw inspi-
ration from reality, they are not an evaluation of 
particular countries’ decisions. 
In what follows, we first offer a brief summary 
of Making fair choices and then discuss three cases.
Summary of Making fair choices on the 
path to universal health coverage
WHO has defined UHC as “all people receiving 
quality health services that meet their needs with-
out being exposed to financial hardship in paying 
for them.”3 This definition leaves room for interpre-
tation. On the understanding adopted here, given 
resource constraints, UHC does not require that all 
possibly effective services are provided to everyone. 
Rather, it requires that a comprehensive range of 
services, well-aligned with other social goals, is 
available to all at bearable cost.
To achieve UHC, countries must advance in at 
least three dimensions: expanding priority services, 
including more people, and reducing out-of-pocket 
payments. In doing so, they face the following crit-
ical decisions: 
• Which services to expand first? 
• Whom to include first? 
• How to shift from out-of-pocket payment to-
ward prepayment and pooling of funds?
Abstract
The goal of achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) can generally be realized only in stages. 
Moreover, resource, capacity, and political constraints mean governments often face difficult trade-offs 
on the path to UHC. In a 2014 report, Making fair choices on the path to UHC, the WHO Consultative 
Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage articulated principles for making such trade-offs in 
an equitable manner. We present three case studies which illustrate how these principles can guide 
practical decision-making. These case studies show how progressive realization of the right to health 
can be effectively guided by priority-setting principles, including generating the greatest total health 
gain, priority for those who are worse off in a number of dimensions (including health, access to health 
services, and social and economic status), and financial risk protection. They also demonstrate the value 
of a fair and accountable process of priority setting.
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They also face trade-offs between these dimensions: 
for example, between covering more services or 
covering more people.
Making fair choices recognizes that many val-
ues are relevant to making these decisions and that 
their importance will depend on each country’s 
context. Nonetheless, it also argues that, in all con-
texts, the following three principles should play a 
central role in evaluating the available alternatives:
1. Health benefit maximization. This involves 
generating the greatest total health-related 
well-being gain. This is measured in terms of the 
total number of healthy life years added through 
an intervention. (One healthy life year is an 
amount of health-related well-being that is just 
as valuable to a person as one year in full health. 
For example, a person gains a healthy life year by 
living one extra year without health problems, or 
by living two extra years with health problems 
which give them only half the quality of life in a 
given year that they would have if they were fully 
healthy. Various measures exist for determining 
the health-related quality of life for a person in a 
given year.4) For a given budget, one maximizes 
total health gain by choosing the interventions 
that cost the least per healthy life year gained. 
These are referred to as the most cost-effective 
interventions. (Below, we shall use multiples of 
a country’s income per person—GDP per cap-
ita—that an intervention requires to generate 
one healthy life year as a measure of cost-ef-
fectiveness. The lower this number, the more 
cost-effective an intervention is. For example, 
for a given budget, an intervention costing two 
times GDP per capita per healthy life-year will 
generate three times as many healthy life-years 
as an intervention costing six times GDP per 
capita).
2. Fair distribution, which incorporates priority 
to the worse off. Coverage and use of services 
should be based on need. Moreover, extra weight 
should be given to the needs of those who are 
relatively disadvantaged with respect to health 
prospects, health outcomes, access to health 
care, or social and economic status (interpreted 
broadly to include groups facing discrimination 
and marginalization).
3. Fair contribution and financial risk protection. 
Contributions for needed coverage and services 
should be based on ability to pay and should not 
depend on individuals’ health risks or the severi-
ty of their condition. Moreover, impoverishment 
due to ill health, associated expenditure, and loss 
of earnings should be minimized.
There are different acceptable ways of balancing 
these three substantive principles’ requirements. 
Moreover, these principles are not exhaustive. 
There is no simple recipe for arriving at the right 
decision and there may be reasonable disagree-
ment on which decisions are right. Under such 
circumstances, fair procedures for setting priorities 
contribute to the legitimacy of decisions. Making 
fair choices therefore also endorses the following 
procedural principle:
4. Accountability. Citizens are not merely recipi-
ents of services, but are also agents who should 
be able to play a part in evaluating, deliberating 
about, and influencing health policy. Mecha-
nisms for strong public accountability should 
therefore be set up to enable them to do so.5 
We shall now summarize how, drawing on these 
principles, Making fair choices develops a frame-
work for making critical choices about expanding 
service coverage, including more people, and shift-
ing to prepayment and pooling of funds.
Which services to expand first?
Health services should be sorted into three priority 
tiers: high, medium, and low, based on their con-
tribution towards health benefit maximization, fair 
distribution, financial risk protection, and other 
relevant values. Though there are many reason-
able ways of weighing these values, it is sensible 
to first create a partial classification on the basis 
of cost-effectiveness (defined as cost per healthy 
life year gained) and then render the classification 
more complete by an appeal to other principles. 
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This involves assigning high priority to highly 
cost-effective interventions and low priority to very 
cost-ineffective interventions, and let other criteria 
help determine the priority class of the intervention 
only in the (substantial) range in between these 
extremes. We emphasize that we do not endorse 
a simple, universally applicable rule. Whether a 
proposed intervention is relatively cost-effective in 
a given context is determined by many factors, in-
cluding the cost-effectiveness of interventions that 
one could do instead.6
One reason for using such a procedure is the 
extreme variability between the cost-effective-
ness of different health services. For example, the 
cost-effectiveness of interventions in the WHO 
Choice database, which gives estimates of the cost 
per healthy life-year gained for an increase in fund-
ing for a wide variety of interventions in various 
regions, is spread over four orders of magnitude.7 
An initial, partial prioritization on the basis of 
cost-effectiveness can therefore help focus resourc-
es where they will do much more good. Moreover, 
focusing on the expansion of highly cost-effective 
services will often offer greatest benefits to the poor, 
because they disproportionately lack access to even 
the most cost-effective services. 
Nonetheless, there are cases in which pursu-
ing only maximal cost-effectiveness would come 
at a cost to the worse off (for example, because 
providing services to poor, remote areas is more 
expensive) or to financial risk protection. In such 
cases, the procedure permits concern for the worse 
off or for financial risk protection (and other rel-
evant concerns) to determine into which priority 
class a service should fall. 
Whom to include first? 
Once sufficient progress has been made in clas-
sifying services, near-universal coverage for 
high-priority services should be at the top of 
countries’ lists. Many countries have significant 
coverage gaps, especially among poor, rural, and 
marginalized groups. In expanding coverage 
for high-priority services against a backdrop of 
inequality, meeting the needs of disadvantaged 
groups is especially important. This implies that, all 
else being equal, an expansion of such services to a 
marginalized population should take priority over 
an expansion to a better-off population.
How to shift from out-of-pocket payments to 
prepayment?
A shift from out-of-pocket payment to mandatory 
prepayment with pooling of funds can alleviate 
the risks of catastrophic health expenditure. When 
making this shift, countries should first reduce 
out-of-pocket payments for high-priority services. 
At the same time, countries should endeavor to 
make prepayments depend on individuals’ ability 
to pay, to ensure that everyone has effective access 
to the most important services. This will reduce 
the risk of financial distress caused by high pay-
ments or ill health.
Accountability
It is advisable to institutionalize accountability 
mechanisms, for example, through founding a 
standing national committee on priority setting. 
A robust system for monitoring progress and for 
policy evaluation is essential for accountability and 
for enabling learning on the path to UHC.
Applying the principles
We shall now discuss how these principles apply 
in three stylized cases. Although we arrive at a 
judgment in each case, other judgments may also 
be reasonable. Moreover, the correct judgment in 
any real-world case will depend on context-specific 
factors, including both particular moral consider-
ations and constraints faced by decision-makers. 
These stylized case studies are therefore not intend-
ed to yield prescriptions that apply in all analogous 
real-world cases. Rather, they are meant to serve 
as discussion pieces, which can illuminate the 
implications of the principles endorsed in Making 
fair choices and illustrate the forms of moral and 
empirical reasoning required to form reasonable 
judgments about real-world cases. 
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Case 1: Cover treatment for hepatitis 
B cirrhosis or extend services to more 
people?
A middle-income country currently ensures effec-
tive access to a basic package of health services for 
60% of the population. (People have effective ac-
cess when they do not incur an excessive financial 
burden in using needed services and face no other 
substantial barriers in accessing them, such as a 
long distance to health services, lack of information, 
insufficient staffing, and other such considerable 
obstacles.) Lack of effective access disproportion-
ately affects members of worse-off socioeconomic 
groups, particularly rural populations. Conse-
quently, those who have access to the package are, 
on average, better off than those who lack it. The 
basic package consists mainly of services that are 
high priority on grounds of cost-effectiveness, pri-
ority to the worse off, and financial risk protection. 
In particular, the vast majority of currently covered 
services cost up to two times GDP per capita for 
each healthy life year gained. Among the services 
not currently included is a treatment for hepatitis 
B cirrhosis. This disease is quite prevalent in the 
country and can lead to cancer or liver failure. The 
incremental cost of including this treatment would 
be six times GDP per capita for each healthy life 
year gained.8
Some new funding has become available, which 
the health authorities can use for one of the following:
1. Add the treatment for hepatitis B cirrhosis. 
This supplements the services provided for the 
population that currently has effective access to 
the benefit package, without extending access to 
other parts of the population.
2. Extend access to the existing package. This offers 
somewhat more people effective access to this 
package, without adding services to it.
 
When faced with this choice, a first step should 
be to estimate the relevant effects of each option. 
These effects will be context-specific. Nonetheless, 
drawing on country experiences, one can offer the 
following general considerations.
Health benefit maximization
Adding the treatment for hepatitis B cirrhosis is far 
less cost-effective than the existing package. Still, 
one must consider that extending access to the exist-
ing package may also be somewhat less cost-effective 
than providing the basic package to the population 
which currently enjoys access, because some parts 
of the population (particularly in rural areas) may 
be harder and more expensive to reach.9 However, 
given that effective access is currently only at 60% 
and that newly available resources will finance only 
a marginal expansion of the population with access, 
it is unlikely that the cost-effectiveness of extending 
access to the existing package will be substantially 
worse than that of the package in the status quo. 
Extending access to the existing package is therefore 
very likely to be the more cost-effective alternative 
and is thus likely to have a greater positive impact on 
population health.
Priority for the worse off
In determining who is worse off in terms of health, 
it is reasonable to consider both an individual’s 
health prospects and their health outcomes.10 
In terms of health prospects, adding the treat-
ment for hepatitis B cirrhosis helps people with 
poor expectations, because hepatitis B sufferers 
have a low life expectancy if untreated. However, 
extending access to the existing package also assists 
people with poor prospects, because those who 
currently lack effective access (mostly the rural 
poor) generally have worse health prospects than 
those who currently have such access. 
In terms of health outcomes, adding the treat-
ment for hepatitis B cirrhosis helps people avert 
a large individual disease burden (29 years of life 
lost in people who die from it).11 This is larger than 
many of the diseases targeted by currently cov-
ered interventions, although not as large as some 
life-threatening childhood illnesses, the interven-
tions for which are covered in the current package. 
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Other grounds for being counted among the 
worse off are low social or economic status. Those 
who currently lack effective access are generally of 
lower social or economic status. Extending access 
to the existing package will therefore help those 
who are worse off in this respect. 
In sum, priority for the worse off in terms of 
health prospects and outcomes may give a reason to 
favor adding the treatment for hepatitis B cirrhosis. 
On the other hand, priority for the worse off in 
terms of social and economic status and in terms of 
access to health services provide reasons to extend 
access to the remaining population. 
Financial risk protection
Adding the treatment for hepatitis B cirrhosis 
will avert some cases of catastrophic expenditure, 
because the treatment is very expensive.12 How-
ever, extending access to the existing package for 
currently underserved populations is also likely 
to considerably reduce financial distress due to 
ill health and health expenditure. Health im-
provements can prevent out-of-pocket payments 
downstream and can increase the income-earning 
potential of the beneficiaries. Because services 
included in the current package are much more 
cost-effective than the treatment for hepatitis B 
cirrhosis, one can prevent much more ill health by 
extending the former. One may therefore be able to 
offer greater financial risk protection by extending 
access to the existing package. 
Recommendation
Considering all three principles, extending access 
to the existing package very likely has great ad-
vantages in terms of both population health and 
improving the lot of the socially or economically 
worse off. While it is a matter of judgment, these 
considerations seem to outweigh the especially 
large individual disease burden that one alleviates 
by adding treatment for hepatitis B cirrhosis. On 
balance, there is therefore a stronger case for ex-
panding access to the existing package.
More generally, to move fairly towards 
UHC, a country should categorize services as 
high, medium, or low priority on the basis of the 
three principles. It should then start with mea-
sures that move it towards universal coverage for 
high-priority services before adding medium- or 
low-priority services to the package.13 The existing 
package consists mostly of high-priority services. 
By contrast, the treatment for hepatitis B can be 
properly classified as a medium or low-priority ser-
vice, because its cost-effectiveness is very low and 
the comparatively large individual disease burden of 
hepatitis B is unlikely to provide a sufficiently strong 
countervailing consideration. (We emphasize, how-
ever, that countries should apply their own weight to 
these considerations.) The general rule therefore rec-
ommends extending access to the existing package. 
Given the substantial interests at stake, the 
decision should be made through a fair priori-
ty-setting process. The health authorities should 
also clearly communicate the grounds for their de-
cision to allow for accountability to the population, 
especially to those affected.
Case 2: Eliminate user fees for maternal 
services for the poorest or for everyone?
A low-income country with high rates of maternal 
and under-five mortality currently charges con-
siderable user fees for health services. These fees 
represent substantial barriers to the use of health 
services for the poor and near-poor, who make 
up around 50% of the population.14 The govern-
ment aims to increase utilization of a package of 
high-priority maternal and child services by adjust-
ing user fees for these services. Without raising new 
taxes, the government only has sufficient budget to 
abolish user fees for the poorest quintile. If user fees 
were to be eliminated for all, new revenue would 
have to be raised for the health system to remain 
financially sustainable. A policy consensus has 
been reached that this new revenue would be raised 
through increasing the value added tax (VAT); to 
protect the poor, essential items such as food would 
be exempted from this tax increase.
The government has the following options: 
1. Eliminate user fees for the poorest quintile only. 
2. Eliminate fees for all while raising VAT (with 
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exemptions for items such as basic foodstuffs 
on which the poor spend a large share of their 
income). 
When faced with a choice between these policies, 
the first step should be an assessment of their ex-
pected impacts. The results of this assessment will 
vary by country. The following analysis draws on 
common country experiences.
Health benefit maximization
If effectively implemented, eliminating user fees 
for the poorest quintile is likely to increase ser-
vice utilization by members of quintile because 
it reduces their financial barriers to access. Some 
low-income countries have indeed had success in 
targeting the poorest for waivers of fees for services 
or insurance premiums.15 However, other countries 
have faced difficulties with such exemptions. In 
countries where a majority of the population de-
rives its income from the informal sector, it is hard 
to establish household income. Other difficulties 
include non-uniform application of exemption 
criteria, verifying the identity of patients, and lack 
of information among users about who is eligible.16 
Moreover, those among the poor and near-poor 
who fall within the remaining 80% of the popula-
tion for which user fees would be kept in place will 
continue to be deterred from seeking treatment. 
Eliminating user fees for all while raising 
VAT avoids the drawbacks often associated with 
targeting and eliminates barriers to the use of some 
high-priority services for all. It is therefore likely 
to lead to increased utilization across all income 
groups.17 This strategy is therefore likely to secure 
greater health gains.18 However, by reducing the 
disposable income of the poor and near-poor, the 
VAT increase will make it more difficult for them 
to improve their lives in other ways. It is therefore 
important to exempt goods and services that make 
up a large part of the poor’s budget.19
Priority for the worse off
In terms of health outcomes, pregnant women, 
mothers, and infants who fall severely ill or die due 
to lack of access to services are among the worse 
off. As argued above, eliminating user fees for all 
is likely to do more to increase service utilization 
among the poor and near-poor and thereby avert 
more of these large individual health burdens. 
In terms of economic status, because all 
income groups pay the same flat fee, the current 
system of substantial user fees makes the poor pay a 
larger proportion of their income for access to need-
ed services.20 Eliminating user fees for the poorest 
quintile will make health system financing fairer in 
this respect. Nonetheless, the remaining 80% of the 
population will still pay a flat fee. Among them, the 
payments remain disproportionately burdensome 
for the less well off.
If the VAT is designed to exempt goods and 
services traded by the poor in the informal econo-
my, eliminating user fees for all while raising VAT 
is likely to more fairly distribute the burden of pay-
ing for the health system. Research indicates that in 
low-income countries, VAT can be implemented so 
that the better off generally pay a larger proportion 
of their incomes in VAT than the poor.21
Overall, eliminating user fees for all is likely to 
be best for the worse off in health and, if the VAT is 
well-designed, is reasonably likely to be best for the 
economically worse off, since it benefits more of the 
poor and near-poor.
 
Financial risk protection
Financing health systems through general tax-
ation rather than user fees means that the cost of 
health care is spread across the population, rather 
than concentrated on those who need it. VAT is a 
predictable expenditure and, unlike large health 
expenditures, is unlikely to impoverish citizens 
who pay it. Financial risk protection therefore fa-
vors eliminating user fees for all.
 
Recommendation
Considering all three principles, eliminating user 
fees for all is likely to be the fairest alternative. First, 
it avoids the problem of identifying the poorest 
quintile for free access. Second, by improving ac-
cess to all poor and near-poor, it promises greater 
health improvements and does more to help the 
worse off in health. Third, it improves financial risk 
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protection for a wider class of poor and near-poor. 
In pursuing this strategy, governments should keep 
in mind common challenges in implementation. 
In particular, they should provide the resources to 
replace the loss in fee income and to meet the antic-
ipated increase in demand.22 Given the substantial 
impact of the decision on people’s access to health 
and disposable income, fair public participation in 
decision-making and public accountability for the 
decision are required.
Case 3: Who should decide which services 
are offered: the judiciary or a priority-
setting institution? 
An upper-middle-income country recognizes the 
“right to health” at the constitutional level. Dis-
putes about what this right entails are commonly 
resolved through the judicial system. The Ministry 
of Health currently formulates a package of health 
interventions for which everyone is meant to be 
covered. It faces frequent legal challenges both 
from citizens who claim that they are not being 
provided with services to which the package en-
titles them and from citizens who claim that they 
should be provided with services not included in 
the package. The country has a civil law system. 
Litigation cases take the form of claims made by 
individual persons and judgments normally apply 
only to the claimant. Courts make decisions on 
the basis of the claimants’ needs, often without 
careful consideration of social costs or competing 
interests. A substantial proportion of claims is for 
services that have been excluded from the standard 
benefit package on the grounds that they offer little 
improvement in health relative to their incremental 
cost—for example, around 80% of the claims for 
pharmaceuticals are for medicines excluded from 
the package for these reasons.23
Recent years have seen a steep increase in the 
number of cases of right to health litigation. In a 
large majority of cases, the courts ruled in favor 
of the claimants.24 Consequently, a substantial 
and increasing proportion of public sector health 
spending is devoted to complying with these 
rulings. This has an impact on the level of health 
provision for other services.25 Legal costs are also 
large: in about half the cases, they exceed the cost of 
the services that were sought.26 The government is 
exploring whether to implement reforms to address 
this situation.
The government is considering the following 
options:
1. Judicial decision-making about service provision. 
This involves maintaining the existing reliance 
on the judiciary to make decisions about specific 
individuals’ claims to services that were initially 
excluded from the government-provided package.
2. Priority setting by a dedicated institution. This in-
volves establishing an entity tasked with making 
decisions about a benefit package for all using 
a publicly accountable process and an explicit 
priority-setting mechanism based upon reason-
able principles. A central task of the judiciary 
will then be to establish whether this process 
has been followed and this mechanism properly 
implemented—including whether individuals 
received services to which they are entitled as 
part of the agreed benefit package.
 
In making this decision, the first step is an assess-
ment of the expected impacts the two approaches 
to priority setting in health. The results of this as-
sessment will vary by country. The following draws 
on common country experiences. 
Health benefit maximization
Judicial decision-making has the drawback that 
courts are generally not well placed to systemati-
cally take account of cost-effectiveness.27 Indeed, at 
present, courts in the country do not even require 
robust evidence of medical effectiveness; a substan-
tial share of claims upheld by the courts is based on 
weak evidence of effectiveness.28 As a consequence, 
the decision is often made to fund expensive ser-
vices that offer limited or highly uncertain benefits. 
This reduces the funds available to provide proven, 
more cost-effective services.
Priority setting by a dedicated institution 
can overcome these problems, if the institution is 
designed to draw on relevant expertise and can 
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be insulated from undue pressures from interest 
groups. An entity that makes decisions at a popula-
tion level, taking into account the system’s capacity, 
the implied trade-offs, and the alternative possible 
uses of resources would be able to have a greater 
positive impact on overall population health with 
a given level of resources.29 Health benefit maximi-
zation therefore requires that such an institution be 
established where the capacity exists to ensure its 
proper functioning.
Priority for the worse off
Bringing a case to court can require significant 
financial resources. It also requires time and 
knowledge of the legal system. Government and 
charity-provided legal support can substantially 
improve the ability of the poor to litigate but, in 
some countries, there are indications that the better 
off are more able to initiate litigation.30 A reliance 
on the judiciary to ensure individual coverage can 
therefore favor the socially and economically better 
off. Thus, judicial decision-making may exacerbate 
inequalities in access to health services. Prioritizing 
the worse off also means giving additional weight to 
the interests of those who bear the greatest disease 
burden. However, the propensity of citizens to seek 
legal remedies varies with features of their situa-
tion that have little relation to their disease burden, 
such as income, social status and access to a lawyer. 
Since citizens who do not bring cases will not have 
their interests heard, the results are opposed to 
equity, which requires equal consideration of cases 
with the same disease burden. Priority setting by 
a dedicated institution can avoid this inequity, if 
care is taken to institutionalize decision-making 
according to fair principles.
Financial risk protection
Because litigation saves some successful claimants 
from very large health expenditures, judicial deci-
sion-making provides some citizens with financial 
risk protection. However, as noted, litigation is often 
for relatively cost-ineffective treatments.31 Litigation 
is therefore likely to divert resources from where 
they will prevent more illness and illness-related 
financial distress. Insofar as litigation is dispropor-
tionately pursued by the better off, it will also have 
a particular impact on resources available to meet 
the needs of the poor and will increase the poor’s 
exposure to the financial risks caused by ill health 
and health expenditure.32
Other considerations
Judicial decision-making has implications for ac-
countability. While courts sometimes recognize 
the need to take into account the aforementioned 
three principles (and other relevant principles), the 
process by which they do so is neither explicit nor 
systematic.33 Generally, judges are not best-placed 
to weigh evidence of medical efficacy. Nor are they 
well-positioned to evaluate the impact of an isolat-
ed decision on the fairness of resource allocation in 
a health system.34 Consequently, it may be difficult 
to discern a coherent rationale in the complete set 
of decisions by different courts. There is also no 
guarantee that relevantly similar cases will be treat-
ed similarly. This thwarts accountability. Priority 
setting by a dedicated institution, in contrast, can 
enhance fairness and legitimacy by making cov-
erage decisions through mechanisms that employ 
reasonable, public principles and that allow for like 
cases to be treated alike.35 
Recommendation
Priority setting by a dedicated institution—estab-
lishing an independent mechanism or body that 
sets priorities in an accountable and transparent 
manner, based on explicit, reasonable criteria—is 
morally preferable. The judiciary has important 
roles to play within this framework. First, to check 
that the priorities pursued by the health authori-
ties are based on reasonable, non-discriminatory 
criteria which are consistently followed. Second, 
to ensure that citizens are granted access to those 
health interventions to which they are entitled un-
der the priority-setting framework. Such recourse 
to legal action is a crucial way in which margin-
alized groups can ensure that their interests are 
properly served.
Despite its promise, one must acknowledge 
threats to this strategy’s success, especially with 
regards to capacity building, establishing a proper 
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independence from interest groups (such as the 
pharmaceutical industry) and short-term political 
pressure, and earning public confidence for both 
the dedicated institution’s knowledge base and 
the impartiality of its decision-making. Countries 
can learn from the experience of nations that have 
managed these threats.36 In the long run, if this re-
form is implemented correctly, it has the potential 
to significantly improve the allocation of scarce 
resources within the health care system. It can 
also contribute to greater public awareness of the 
unavoidability of setting priorities.
Conclusion
Because all governments face resource, institu-
tional, and political constraints, moving towards 
UHC involves balancing competing interests. 
The progressive realization of the right to health 
requires that such trade-offs be made fairly.37 The 
three case studies presented here show how this can 
be done by using the principles articulated by the 
WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal 
Health Coverage. These principles include health 
benefit maximization, priority for the worse off, 
financial risk protection, and accountability. There 
is no simple algorithm for using these principles 
(and other principles that are relevant in a particu-
lar context) to arrive at a correct decision—often, a 
difficult exercise in judgment is required. Nonethe-
less, these case studies illustrate that, by employing 
these principles in careful empirical and moral 
reasoning, it is possible to arrive at decisions that 
advance us towards the goal of ensuring everyone 
has affordable access to a comprehensive range of 
needed health services.
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